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The pursuit of beauty: the enforcement of
aesthetics or a freely adopted lifestyle?
Henri Wijsbek Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
Abstract
Facelifts, tummy tucks and breast enlargements are no
longer the privilege of the rich and the famous. Any
woman can have all these and many more cosmetic
surgical treatments, and an increasing number of
women do. Are they having cosmetic surgery because
they are duped by a male-dominated beauty system, or
do they genuinely choose these operations themselves?
Feminists (and others) give diametrically opposed
answers to this question. At the heart of the
controversy, or so I claim in this article, lies a
conceptual problem about free choice; therefore, the only
thing that can settle it is a conceptual analysis of
“freedom”. After having briefly outlined the views of
both sides of the debate, I oVer such an analysis.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2000;26:454–458)
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1. Introduction
Considering the amount of time, money and eVort
some people spend on clothes, cosmetics and their
looks in general, the pursuit of beauty is a lifestyle if
anything is. One feminist aptly calls it “a deeply
significant existential project”1; not a bad definition
of “lifestyle” actually.We take an enormous interest
in the way our body looks: we paint and pierce it, we
keep it in shape through exercise and diet, and we
take it to the cosmetic surgeon if we’re really dissat-
isfied with some specific part of it. People do go to
considerable lengths and are willing to incur serious
risks, to change the appearance of their bodies for
what they take to be the better.
Concern about their looks guides people’s lives.
So in one important sense the pursuit of beauty is
clearly a lifestyle. But paradigmatically, in order to
qualify as a lifestyle, a way of life should also be
something you have chosen yourself. A lifestyle is a
way of showing the world which things in life you
deem important, what kind of life you want to live,
what kind of person you want to be. This goes for
men as well as for women. But the massive pressure
on women to live up to some ideal standard of
beauty, makes it particularly doubtful whether
women’s choices concerning appearance are any-
thing but mere reflections of fashion, or worse still,
of male-dominated power relations. Can women’s
pursuit of youth and beauty, then, ever really
qualify as a freely adopted lifestyle?
2. Morgan and the technological beauty
imperative
At least one feminist answers the last question with
a resounding “No”! In an article entitled “Women
and the knife: cosmetic surgery and the coloniza-
tion of women’s bodies”, Kathryn Pauly Morgan
sets out to investigate whether cosmetic surgery is
liberating or coercive. As the title suggests, she has
no doubts about the outcome. What makes her
article interesting therefore, is rather what makes
her think that, despite appearances to the contrary,
women are coerced into cosmetic surgery. The key
to her answer lies in what she calls “paradoxes of
choice’” that is, situations that leave women no real
options at all. She distinguishes three such
paradoxes.
The first is the paradox of conformity: women do
not use the medical technology to underscore their
uniqueness or eccentricity, rather they all let the
one and the same “Baywatch” standard determine
their looks. “More often than not, what appear at
first glance to be instances of choice turn out to be
instances of conformity.”1
Secondly, women who involve themselves in the
pursuit of youth and beauty do not take their body
as something natural or given, but rather as raw
material to be shaped and pruned to fit some exter-
nal standard. Their bodies are transformed for oth-
ers to exploit them. And it is men who are wielding
the power, either actual men or merely imagined
men who occupy the consciousness of women and
make them into self-surveying subjects. This is the
paradox of colonisation. It looks as if women are
cultivating their own bodies, whereas in fact their
bodies are being colonised by men.
Finally, there is an overwhelming pressure to
undergo cosmetic surgery. The technological
beauty imperative enforces itself in numerous ways:
through advertising, articles in the media, in
so-called success stories, in Miss America pageants.
At the same time, the beauty imperative sets a new
norm: those who refuse to submit to it will become
stigmatised. What used to be normal is rapidly
becoming deviant, problematic, inadequate and
deformed. Eventually, Morgan ventures, “the
‘ordinary’ will come to be perceived and evaluated
as the ‘ugly’”.2 The fact that women are coerced to
avail themselves of these techniques and the
ensuing pathological inversion of the normal
constitutes the third paradox, the paradox of
coerced voluntariness and the technological im-
perative.
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Whenever a woman conforms to some single,
external standard imposed on her, the conditions of
genuine choice have not been met. If any of these
paradoxes prevail therefore, she is not making a
choice of her own, but is being forced to adapt her-
self to men’s norms. Actually not just men’s norms,
nor just “white, western and Anglo-Saxon” norms,
but norms that are “male-supremacist, racist,
ageist, heterosexist, anti-Semitic, ableist and class-
biased” and to be on the safe side,Morgan adds the
ominous “eugenicist” as well.3
3. Davis and the desire to be ordinary
In her very interesting book, Reshaping the Female
Body, Kathy Davis oVers a totally diVerent picture
of cosmetic surgery and the partial freedom women
enjoy to avail themselves of its mixed blessings.
Davis has investigated the actual decision process of
women contemplating undergoing cosmetic sur-
gery. Typically, they take the step of consulting a
cosmetic surgeon only after having pondered the
decision for years. Often they seek support from a
woman who has had cosmetic surgery herself,
rarely from a husband or lover. Usually they have to
overcome opposition, from friends, family and col-
leagues. All the women Davis talked with insisted
they wanted the surgery for themselves. Interest-
ingly, even women with very bad side eVects and
permanent disfigurement were happy they had
finally taken their lives into their own hands.
The women Davis spoke to, mostly women who
had had their breasts augmented or reduced,
invariably described years of suVering before even
thinking about consulting a cosmetic surgeon.
Their suVering, so convincingly rendered by Davis,
had pervaded the whole of their lives: when buying
clothes, when going to the beach, when doing sport,
when having sex. They had been constantly
reminded that their breasts were too big or too
small.
One of the women, Sandra, complained that her
breasts made her seem like somebody else: “Big
breasts are supposed to be sexy. So you got to be a
sex-bomb, whether you want or not”. She spent
years hiding her breasts under bulky sweaters and
leather jackets, trying to avoid being reduced to
“just a pair of tits”.4 Ellen suVered from the oppo-
site “problem”. One story she tells is particularly
poignant. She had just given birth to her first child
and was lying in a hospital bed, on top of the world,
feeling one hundred per cent woman. Then the
nurse came in to sponge her oV. She started wash-
ing Ellen’s face, then her breasts, and she blurted
out: “Gee, you’re flat as a pancake, aren’t you?”
Even as she was telling this to Davis she began to
cry. “It was like being stabbed with a knife; it was, it
was so awful, just really awful”.5
Sandra and Ellen didn’t want to become beauti-
ful, they wanted to become ordinary. They wanted
to put an end to their suVering, and cosmetic
surgery had come to be the only way to achieve
their goal.
In the last chapter of her book, Davis takes issue
with Morgan about the nature of cosmetic surgery
and the freedom of choice.Davis does not deny that
there is pressure on women to have their bodies
altered, but throughout her book she stresses wom-
en’s agency. Cosmetic surgery is not simply
imposed, it is fervently desired by its recipients.
Women having cosmetic surgery are knowledgeable
and responsible agents, no “more duped by the
feminine beauty-system than women who do not
see cosmetic surgery as a remedy to their problems
with their appearance”.6 At the same time, she
regrets the fact that women are willing to undergo
risky operations. She wishes that circumstances
would be otherwise and that women would choose
a diVerent course of action.
4. The problem
I find this controversy between Morgan and Davis
fascinating. Who is right? And if either is, how can
it be established which one? On the face of it, Dav-
is’s conclusions seem to be by far the more plausi-
ble. They are based on sound, empirical research,
whereas Morgan has done little more by way of
empirical investigation than skim a few glossy
magazines featuring interviews with knife-happy
surgical dopes. Moreover, Davis, somewhat to her
own surprise and against her own will, comes up
with a balanced, not to say ambiguous view of cos-
metic surgery. She weighs the pros and cons
carefully and draws a conclusion that is almost
shocking to the feminist she considers herself to be,
let alone to more orthodox feminists with whom
she has indeed experienced some troubling and
unpleasant confrontations because of her liberal
outlook. In that sense, her book is open-minded
and courageous. Morgan’s article on the other
hand, smacks of lopsided exaggeration. She knew
all along what she thought about cosmetic surgery,
and drives home the politically correct analysis with
force once again.
I’m afraid, however, that the controversy cannot
be so easily settled in favour of Davis. It is not at all
an easy job to decide how the data should be inter-
preted. Morgan could acknowledge all of Davis’s
results and yet stick to her own theory.Women may
well say or think they make their own choices,
whereas in fact they are only doing what the sexist,
anti-Semitic, ageist, etc, etc, system requires them
to do. It is hard to see how this disagreement about
the interpretation of the empirical data could be
solved empirically.
One of Davis’s main objectives is to find a way of
being critical of a beauty-system that treats women
as inferior, without blaming the women who
partake in it. But how can she do so, while at the
same time stressing women’s agency? Her
formula—own choice, bounded circumstances—is
not very satisfactory, because choices are always
made with less than complete information, under
conditions not wholly of the agent’s own making,
and with few if any ideal options available. It seems
to follow from her assumptions that women are
blameable after all. How could anyone choose to
partake in a blameable practice, without her- or
himself incurring any blame?
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Actually, Morgan’s views seem to be more
condoning of women. If they do not choose to
undergo cosmetic surgery, but are rather coerced
into compliance by an oppressive beauty-system,
they can hardly be blamed for being so coerced. It
is the system that should be blamed, not its victims.
But Morgan’s views have some nasty implications
as well.Not only are women victims, they are duped
victims at that, surgical dopes, not real agents
responsible for their own doings.
Underlying the disagreement between Morgan
and Davis is a conceptual problem about freedom
and responsibility. Before we can answer the ques-
tion whether women who participate in the beauty-
system are blameable agents or innocent zombies,
or whether yet a third characterisation is more
appropriate, we must become clear about the con-
ditions of freedom, agency and blame.
5. Freedom, agency and blame
Neither Morgan nor Davis makes it very clear how
the beauty-system actually sustains its coercive
influence. Morgan has not empirically investigated
the matter, but she makes two suggestions. In the
first place, its evil influence is spread by men,
“brothers, fathers, male lovers, male engineering
students who taunt and harass their female
counterparts, and by male cosmetic surgeons”. And
if not by actual men, then by “hypothetical men”
who live “ghostly but powerful lives in the reflective
awareness of women”.7
Davis, who has painstakingly investigated wom-
en’s actual decision process, concludes that con-
trary to what is assumed by Morgan and many oth-
ers, women are not pressed into the operation by
actual men. As a matter of fact, husbands and boy-
friends more often than not try to talk their partners
out of it. For that reason, some women even
concealed that they were planning to have an
operation from their husbands or boyfriends. Actu-
ally, when Davis describes what makes women try
cosmetic surgery as a last resort, other women fig-
ure prominently not only as support, but also as
catalysts. Many of the painful remarks about their
appearance were made by other women, either out
of jealousy, or condescension or mere thoughtless-
ness. I have already mentioned the nurse’s remark
about Ellen, but Davis quotes some others as well,
for instance: “Gosh, I thought you had more than
that!” and “Big breasts are so-o-o uncomfortable
dear. I wish I had yours”.8
However, Davis does think a considerable
pressure is being exerted by something much more
abstract and far less tangible than real men or
women, something she calls “the beauty-system” or
“the gender society”, and sometimes still less
specific “the social order”, without elaborating on
the content or working of this “social order”. I sup-
pose this is the same as what Morgan refers to when
she uses the more picturesque phrase “hypothetical
men”. But according to Davis this pressure is not so
strong as actually to coerce women into cosmetic
surgery. They are left with a choice.Her formula for
this ambiguous situation was: choice, constrained
by circumstances which are not of the agent’s own
making. The constraints she refers to are the
relative lack of information about the operation and
its possible consequences and secondly, the lack of
viable alternatives for women in a society organised
by gender and power hierarchies.
Lack of information is something that is inherent
in all choice situations. People do not have perfect
foresight: some options are apt to be overlooked,
and the ones considered can always turn out to be
diVerent from what was being imagined. Notori-
ously this holds for medical interventions. But only
if the surgeon withholds available and relevant
information on purpose could the situation be
called coercive. In that case, women would be
forced to make a decision on a skewed set of data.
If this actually happens, they cannot make a free
decision and therefore they cannot be held respon-
sible for it. But this is hardly a controversial case. I
take it that literally everybody agrees that the
surgeon should give the woman all the relevant
data. If he does not, he is to be blamed, not she.
The complaint about lack of viable options is
much more diYcult to deal with. What options are
lacking, what circumstances should be diVerent? I
have no reliable figures, and they would be very
hard to come by, but the number of women who do
opt for cosmetic surgery is almost negligible
compared to the number who do not. In order to
make the claim that women have no viable options
except cosmetic surgery at all plausible, the
category of women to whom it applies has to be
made much more precise. Suppose such a category
could be defined: women with characteristics a, b
and c all opt for cosmetic surgery under circum-
stances x, y and z. Even if this claim could be vindi-
cated, nothing as yet would have been established
as to what actually causes them to do so. Physical
and psychological characteristics such as size of
breasts and lack of self assurance would presumably
figure on the one side, and stereotypes and role
models are among the things that would figure on
the other side of some such explanation.
Causal explanation
Suppose then that the statistically significant corre-
lation could be dressed up to a causal explanation
for this well-defined category of women, would that
make them into the unfree and irresponsible zom-
bies Morgan takes them to be? Not necessarily.
Being caused to do something is not in itself a
threat to either freedom or responsibility. It would
only be so if you hold that free and responsible
agency implies the ability to act in defiance of the
causal network that makes up the rest of the world.
It is a wildly implausible claim that people have
such a contracausal metaphysical power and I have
nothing to say to its credit. If you were to trace the
antecedents of any act far enough, you would
always find that its causes lie outside the agent.
Usually acts are considered to flow from some
combination of beliefs and desires. But of course
one can always push the inquiry one step further
back and ask where these beliefs and desires come
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from. Ultimately, they will be caused by something
the person is not in control of. If being the ultimate
cause of one’s actions were a necessary condition
for agency, nobody would ever be an agent.
According to a metaphysically less extraordinary
view, agency is compatible with people being
subject to all the laws that govern the rest of nature.
A feeling of thirst normally causes me to try and
quench it. I think I am very lucky to be caused to act
in that way and I do not wish it were otherwise. The
fact that I am caused to act in a certain way, does
not imply that I must act in an insensible or
mechanical way. I do not drink just anything;
depending on further circumstances I take some-
thing hot or cold, sweet or bitter, alcoholic or non-
alcoholic. And if I am attending a lecture, I wait
until it is over before having my drink, because I
think it would be ill-mannered to walk away in the
middle of the lecture for such a reason. Normally,
what I will actually do and when I will do it, is the
outcome of my deliberation. As long as my acts are
sensible responses to the requirements of the situa-
tion, as long as I am able to respond adequately to
all its relevant features, I have all the freedom I can
possibly wish. If these relevant features leave me no
option but the right (or a right) one, that is no more
a serious constraint on my freedom than the analo-
gous constraint on belief formation would be. Our
freedom would not be diminished if we were always
caused to have only true beliefs.
Best chances
The way Davis describes the women who take
recourse to cosmetic surgery, fits this picture very
well. These women have a problem—an indisput-
able kind of suVering—they survey their options,
and they pick that option that promises them the
best chances to overcome their problem. They
respond sensibly to the situation, make an intelligi-
ble decision and act accordingly. In particular, they
don’t expect the operation to work miracles, for
instance that it will save a broken marriage. Admit-
tedly, it is a somewhat risky option, but not an out-
rageously risky one. It seems therefore, that their
decisions are based on a prudent cost-benefit
analysis. What reasons could there be to call even
this particular category of women innocent zom-
bies and their decisions unfree or coerced? They do
indeed seem to have all the characteristics of
knowledgeable and responsible agents.
It might be countered that even if the “gender
society” leaves women’s capacity to reason instru-
mentally unimpaired, it distorts their capacity to
form values to act on. Although I find this very hard
to believe, it is conceivable that women or a
category of women are manipulated in such a way
that they are no longer able to discern which
features of their lives really matter. In that case, they
would be duped by magazines, advertisements and
all the rest into putting beauty and appearance at
the top of their preference-ordering. They would
value beauty more than they should, spend more
time and money on cosmetics than is proper and
accord too little weight to other important things in
life. To put it briefly, they would have become
obsessed by their appearance, and obsession does
not sit well with free agency.
But who can tell what the proper amount of
attention is to pay to your appearance? Is lipstick
OK? Going to the hairdresser? Being choosy about
the clothes you wear? Dieting? Fitness? Twice a
week? Two hours a day? Everybody can come up
with extreme examples of paying either too much or
too little attention to appearance, but in between all
causes are hard cases. And I think that is how it
should be. All lifestyles can give rise to misgivings.
Who can ever be sure she is not according too much
importance in life to something not really worth it?
How can you know that you would not be happier
or lead a more satisfying life if you had chosen
something completely diVerent? To take up a
lifestyle is to forsake other lifestyles that are equally
worthy of being chosen. That is one of the reasons
Morgan’s description of the pursuit of beauty is
such an appropriate definition of a lifestyle in gen-
eral: it is “a deeply significant existential project”,
with all the meaningfulness and uncertainty that
usually go with such projects.
After this, what is left of Morgan’s three
paradoxes? As to the first, women, except perhaps
for a very small category of women, do not conform
to a single standard. But even for this category, that
fact in itself is no more significant than that a large
number of Victorian men had whiskers or that
nowadays some men practise body-building. Sec-
ondly, that this standard can be traced back to
external influences is a property it shares with
many, if not all, of our beliefs and desires. Finally, if
you actually look at the decision process of these
women, you will find that it forms a reasonable and
adequate response to their problems and so is an
expression of their freedom rather than an obstacle
to it.
Alternative explanation
But even if women who have cosmetic surgery have
all the characteristics of full-blown agents, the
possibility is still left open that they are blameable
agents, a possibility I took to be a consequence of
Davis’s position. That would be so if they
knowingly and willingly were involving themselves
in a morally reprehensible practice. Is cosmetic sur-
gery reprehensible? According to Davis, the women
who have cosmetic surgery do so in order not to be
constantly looked at or made the object of oVensive
remarks, whether well meant or not; and they want
to feel at ease in their own bodies. An alternative
explanation would be that they want to look more
beautiful. Both the ordinary and the beautiful are
respectable and it is hardly blameworthy to strive
for either.
If you want to become a proficient piano player,
you must practise daily; if you write a scientific
article, you don’t expect the first draft to qualify as
the final version; only with eVort do we learn to
become a good friend, parent, partner. Usually, to
actualise values—be it artistic, scientific or moral
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values—is hard work. Why then should we have to
accept our appearances as given?
6. Lingering doubts
Still, I can imagine that not everybody will be per-
suaded that women have a free choice in these mat-
ters. Given that circumstances are as they are,
women are free to choose whether they want to
have recourse to cosmetic surgery. To be free in a
practical sense does not mean to be the uninflu-
enced originator of all your thoughts and actions;
whoever fits that description is doomed to act in a
haphazard and unintelligible way. Rather, it means
to be able to respond adequately to the circum-
stances in which you find yourself. We want “a
freedom within the world, not a freedom from it”, in
Susan Wolf’s apt phrase.9
But sometimes we want the world to be diVerent,
rather than just to be able to respond adequately to
the way it happens to be. Ideals of beauty and
stereotypes diVer from biological needs such as
thirst, since they are not given in the same inescap-
able way. DiVerent cultural ideals for women (and
men) come and go, for example take fashion: slim
in the twenties, buxom in the fifties. In a sense you
could say these cultural ideals are made by human
beings, albeit not in any direct or simple way. They
would be very hard to influence for individuals, but
perhaps governments or non-governmental organi-
sations should do their utmost to change them. Or
rather, to get rid of them altogether. After all,
changing them would only change the category of
women that could not live up to them and hence the
category of women that would suVer from falling
short of these ideals.
I suppose that this is what Davis meant when she
said she wished circumstances could be diVerent.
Plastic surgery should not be an eligible way for
women to overcome their problems with their
appearance, because in Davis’s ideal world, women
would not have any problems with their appearance
to begin with.
What would the world look like if Davis’s wish
were realised? It is very hard to imagine a world
without such ever-changing beauty norms, but
nevertheless, let me end with some speculations. It
would be a world in which no woman ever suVered
from the way she looked, because no woman, nor
anybody else, would care about how she looked.
Everybody would have become insensitive to
aesthetic properties; nobody would be moved by
Vermeer’s Girl with the pearl or Schubert’s Schöne
Müllerin. There would be no poetry, only social-
realistic prose. It would be a paradise for pigs, and
a boring place for people. In my view, that is too
high a price to pay to get rid of cosmetic surgery.
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